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Resumo
O objetivo do presente trabalho é mostrar dois resultados básicos relativos à 
tradução entre lógicas:
O primeiro resultado estabelece que, dadas duas lógicas S1 e S2, com linguagens L1 
e L2, e uma tradução F de L1 em L2 que interpreta S1 em S2, então, dada qualquer 
lógica intermediária S3 entre S1 e S2, a mesma tradução F Interpreta S1 em S3.
[2] O segundo resultado estabelece que a tradução F não pode interpretar S3 em S2.
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Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to show two basic results concerning translation 
between logics:
[1] The first result establishes that given two logics S1 and S2 with languages L1 
and L2, and a translation F of L1 into L2 that interprets S1 into S2, then, given 
any intermediate logic S3 between S1 and S2, the same translation F interprets S1 
into S3.
[2] The second result establishes that the translation F cannot interpret S3 into S2.
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1. Introduction
In the late twenties and early thirties of last century several results were ob-
tained connecting different logics and theories. These results assumed the 
form of translations/interpretations of one logic/theory into another logic/
theory. In 1925 Kolmogorov defined a translation from classical logic into 
minimal logic aiming to show that “classical mathematics” could be translated 
into “intuitionistic mathematics” ([1] and [2]). In 1929 Glivenko [3] proved 
two fundamental results connecting provability in classical propositional logic 
to provability in intutionistic propositional logic. In 1933, Gödel ([4] and [6]) 
and Gentzen [7] independently defined an interpretation of Classical/Peano 
Arithmetic (PA) into Heyting´s arithmetic (HA). In 1933 Gödel [5] also de-
fined an interpretation of intuitionistic propositional logic into classical modal 
logic S4. All these results were obtained in a foundational environment: the 
main motivation was to reduce foundational problems in a classical setting, 
like the consistency problem, to the same problems in an intuitionistic/con-
structive setting, aiming to show that if the problems could be solved in the 
intuitionistic setting, they could also be solved in the original classical setting.
The first general approach to translations was proposed by Prawitz and 
Malmnäs in [8]. According to Prawitz and Malmnäs, a translation from a 
deductive system/Logic S1 into a deductive system/Logic S2 is simply a func-
tion F from the language L1 of S1 into the language L2 of S2. S1 is said to be 
interpretable in S2 if the translation F satisfies the following condition:
     
    
A   iff       
   
F[A]
If for each set       {A} of formulas of L1 we have
        
   
A   iffF           
    
F[A]
Where F[  ] = {F[B]: B     }
We say that S1 is interpretable in S2 with respect to derivability.
The aim of the present paper is to show two basic results concerning 
translation between logics:
[1] The first result establishes that given two logics S1 and S2 with lan-
guages L1 and L2, and a translation F of L1 into L2 that interprets S1 into S2, 
then, given any intermediate logic S3 between S1 and S2, the same transla-
tion F interprets S1 into S3.
[2] The second result establishes that the translation F cannot interpret S3 into S2.
2. Results
Let S2 and S1 be two logics such that every deductive relation in S2 is also a 
deductive relation in S1, but not every deductive relation in S1 is a deductive 
relation in S2. A well-know example is obtained if we take S2 = Intuitionistic 
Logic and S1 = Classical Logic. A logic S3 is said to be an intermediate logic 
between S1 and S2 if and only if:
(i) Every deductive relation in S2 is also a deductive relation in S3;
(ii) Not every deductive relation in S3 is a deductive relation in S2.
(iii) Every deductive relation in S3 is also a deductive relation in S1;
(iv) Not every deductive relation in S1 is a deductive relation in S3.
Theorem 1: Let S1 and S2 be two logics formulated in the languages L1 
and L2 respectively, and let F be a translation from L1 into L2 that interprets 
S1 into S2. Let S3 be an intermediate logic between S1 and L2. Then, if F also 
satisfies the property that A -||- F(A) in S1, then F is a translation from L1 into 
the language L3 of S3 that interprets S1 into S3.
Proof: By hypothesis, 
Given that S3 is intermediate between S1 and S2, 
The other direction follows directly from the hypothesis that 
A -||- F[A] in S1
Remark: From this basic result we can conclude that double-negation 
translations (Gentzen/Gödel) can also interpret Classical logic into the logic 
of Constant Domains (CD) and into Dummett’s logic. We can also give a 
general explanation why we can use the same translation to interpret classical 
logic into intuitionistic logic and minimal logic.
Theorem 2: The translation F of theorem 1 cannot be a translation from 
S3 into S2.
Proof: Assume F is a translation from S3 into S2. Then, 
                Take any  Γ  and  A  such that                                       Given that 
F is a translation from S1 into S2, we have that                           and hence that 
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Proof: Assume F is  translation from S3 into S2. Then, Γ⎥⎯S3 A ⇔ F(Γ)⏐⎯S2 F(A). Take 
any Γ and A such that Γ⎥⎯S1A. Given that F is a translation from S1 into S2, we have that 
F(Γ)⏐⎯S2F(A) and hence that  (because F is also a translation from S3 into S2) Γ⎥⎯S3 A. So, every 
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logic, as we had assumed. 
3. References 
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lógicas: 
O primeiro resultado estabelece que, dadas duas lógicas S1 e S2, com linguagens L1 e L2, e uma 
tradução F de L1 em L2 que interpreta S1 em S2, então, dada qualquer lógica intermediária S3 entre 
S1 e S2, a mesma tradução F Interpreta S1 em S3. 
[2] O segundo resultado estabelece que a tradução F não pode interpretar S3 em S2. 
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logics: 
[1] The first result establishes that given two logics S1 and S2 with languages L1 and L2, and a 
translation F of L1 into L2 that interprets S1 into S2, then, given any intermediate logic S3 between 
S1 and S2, the same translation F interprets S1 into S3. 
[2] The second result establishes that the translation F cannot interpret S3 into S2. 
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1. Introduction
In the late twenties and early thirties of last century several results were ob-
tained connecting different logics and theories. These results assumed the 
form of translations/interpretations of one logic/theory into another logic/
theory. In 1925 Kolmogorov defined a translation from classical logic into 
minimal logic aiming to show that “classical mathematics” could be translated 
into “intuitionistic mathematics” ([1] and [2]). In 1929 Glivenko [3] proved 
two fundamental results connecting provability in classical propositional logic 
to provability in intutionistic propositional logic. In 1933, Gödel ([4] and [6]) 
and Gentzen [7] independently defined an interpretation of Classical/Peano 
Arithmetic (PA) into Heyting´s arithmetic (HA). In 1933 Gödel [5] also de-
fined an interpretation of intuitionistic propositional logic into classical modal 
logic S4. All these results were obtained in a foundational environment: the 
main motivation was to reduce foundational problems in a classical setting, 
like the consistency problem, to the same problems in an intuitionistic/con-
structive setting, aiming to show that if the problem  co l  be olve  in the 
intuitionistic setting, they could also be solved in the original classical setting.
The first general approach to translations was proposed by Prawitz and 
Malmnäs in [8]. According to Prawitz and Malmnäs, a translation from a 
deductive system/Logic S1 into a deductive system/Logic S2 is simply a func-
tion F from the language L1 of S1 into the language L2 of S2. S1 is said to be 
interpretable in S2 if the translation F satisfies the following condition:
     
    
A   iff       
   
F[A]
If for each set       {A} of formulas of L1 we have
        
   
A   iffF           
    
F[A]
Where F[  ] = {F[B]: B     }
We say that S1 is interpretable in S2 with respect to derivability.
The aim of the present paper is to show two basic results concerning 
translation between logics:
[1] The first result establishes that given two logics S1 and S2 with lan-
guages L1 and L2, and a translation F of L1 into L2 that interprets S1 into S2, 
then, given any intermediate logic S3 between S1 and S2, the same transla-
tion F interprets S1 into S3.
[2] The second result establishes that the translation F cannot interpret S3 into S2.
2. Results
Let S2 and S1 be two logics such that every deductive relation in S2 is also a 
deductive relation in S1, but not every deductive relation in S1 is a deductive 
relation in S2. A well-know example is obtained if we take S2 = Intuitionistic 
Logic and S1 = Classical Logic. A logic S3 is said to be an intermediate logic 
between S1 and S2 if and only if:
(i) Every deductive relation in S2 is also a deductive relation in S3;
(ii) Not every deductive relation in S3 is a deductive relation in S2.
(iii) Every deductive relation in S3 is also a deductive relation in S1;
( v) Not every d ductive relation in S1 is a deductive relation in S3.
Theorem 1: Let S1 and S2 be two logics formulated in the languages L1 
and L2 respectively, and let F be a translation from L1 into L2 that interprets 
S1 into S2. Let S3 be an intermediate logic between S1 and L2. Then, if F also 
satisfies the property that A -||- F(A) in S1, then F is a translation from L1 into 
the language L3 of S3 that interprets S1 into S3.
Proof: By hypothesis, 
Given that S3 is intermediate between S1 and S2, 
The other irection follows directly from the hypothesis that 
A -||- F[A] in S1
Remark: From this basic result we can conclude that double-negation 
translations (Gentzen/Gödel) can also interpret Classical logic into the logic 
of Constant Domains (CD) and into Dummett’s logic. We can also give a 
general explanation why we can use the same translation to interpret classical 
logic into intuitionistic logic and minimal logic.
Theorem 2: The translation F of theorem 1 cannot be a translation from 
S3 into S2.
Proof: Assume F is a translation from S3 into S2. Then, 
                Take any  Γ  and  A  such that                                       Given that 
F is a translation from S1 into S2, we have that                           and hence that 
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3. References 
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F(Γ)⏐⎯S2F(A) and hence that  (because F is also a translation from S3 into S2) Γ⎥⎯S3 A. So, every 
deductive relation in S1 is also a deductive relation in S3 and S3 would not be an intermediate 
logic, as we had assumed. 
3. References 
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1. Introduction 
In the late twenties and early thirties of la t century several results were obtained connec ing 
different logics and theories. These results assumed the form of translations/interpretations of one 
logic/theory into another logic/theory. In 1925 Kolmogorov defined a translation from classical 
logic into minimal logic aiming to show that “classical mathematics” could be translated into 
“intuitionistic mathematics”([1] and [2]). In 1929 Glivenko [3] proved two fundamental results 
connecting provability in cl ssic l propositional logi  to provability in intutionistic propositional 
logic. In 1933, Gödel ([4] and [6]) and Gentzen [7] independently defined an interpretation of 
Classical/Peano Arithmetic (PA) into Heyting´s arithmetic (HA). In 1933 Gödel [5] also defined an 
interpretation of intuitionistic propositional logic into classical modal logic S4. All these results 
were obtained in a foundational environment: the main motivation was to reduce foundational 
problems in a classical setting, like the consistency pr blem, to the same problems in an 
intuitionistic/constructive setting, aiming to show that if the problems c uld be solved in the 
intuitionistic setting, they could also be solved in the original classical setting.
The first general approach to translations was proposed by Pr witz and M lmnäs in [8]. 
According to Prawitz and Malmnäs, a translation from a deductive system/Logic S1 into a 
deductive system/Logic S2 is simply a function F from the language L  of S1 into the language L2 
of S2. S1 is said to be interpretable in S2 if the translation F satisfies the following condition: 
⏐⎯S1A   iff⏐⎯S2F[A] 
If for each set Γ∪ {A} of formulas of L1 we have 
Γ⏐⎯S1A   iff F[Γ]⏐⎯S2F[A] 
Where F[Γ] = {F[B]:  ∈Γ} 
e say that S1 is interpretable in S2 ith respect to derivability. 
The aim of the present paper is to show two basic results concerning translation between logics: 
[ ] e first res lt esta lishes that given two logics S1 and S2 with languages L1 and L2, and a 
translation F of L1 into L2 that interprets S1 into S2, then, given any intermediate logic S3 between 
S1 and S2, the same translation Finterprets S1 into S3. 
e second result establi hes t at the translatio  F cannot interpret S3 into S2. 
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Resumo 
O objetivo do presente trabalho é mostrar dois resultados básicos relativos à tradução entre 
lógicas: 
O primeiro resultado estabelece que, dadas duas lógicas S1 e S2, com linguagens L1 e L2, e uma 
tradução F de L1 em L2 que interpreta S1 em S2, então, dada qualquer lógica intermediária S3 entre 
S1 e S2, a mesma tradução F Interpreta S1 em S3. 
[2] O segundo resultado estabelece que a tradução F não pode interpretar S3 em S2. 
Palavras-chave: Traduções, Lógicas intermediárias. 
Abstract 
The aim of the present paper is to show two basic results concerning translation between 
logics: 
[1] The first result establishes that given two logics S1 and S2 with languages L1 and L2, and a 
translation F of L1 into L2 that interprets S1 into S2, then, given any intermediate logic S3 between 
S1 and S2, the same translation F interprets S1 into S3. 
[2] The second result establishes that the translation F cannot interpret S3 into S2. 
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  Logics.	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(because F is also a translation from S3 into S2)         So, every deductive 
relation in S1 is also a deductive relation in S3 and S3 would not be an inter-
mediate logic, as we had assumed.
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2. Results 
Let S1 and S2 be two logics such that every deductive relation in S1 is also a deductive 
relation in S2, but not every deductive relation in S2 is a deductive relatio  in S1. A well-know 
example is obtained if we take S1 = Intuitionistic Logic and L2 = Classical Logic. A logic S3 is said 
to be an intermediate logic between S1 and S2 if and only if: 
(i) Every deductive relation in S1 is also a deductive relation in S3; 
(ii) Not every deductive relation in S3 is a deductive relation in S1. 
(iii) Eve y deductive relation in S3 is also a deductive relation in S2; 
(iv) Not every deductive relation in S2 is a deductive relation in S3. 
 
Theorem 1: Let S1 and S2 be two logics formulated in the languages L1 and L2 
respectively, and let F be a translation from L2 into L1 that interprets S2 into S1. Let S3 be an 
intermediate logic between S1 and L2. Then, if F also satisfies the property that A -||- F(A) in S1, 
then F is a translation from L2 into the language L3 of S3 that interprets S2 into S3. 
Proof: By hypothesis, Γ⎥⎯S1A ⇔F(Γ)⏐⎯S2F(A) 
Given that S3 is intermediate between S1 and S2, Γ⏐⎯S1A ⇒ F(Γ)⏐⎯S2 F(A) and F(Γ)⏐⎯S3 F(A). 
The other direction follows directly from the hypothesis that  
A -||- F[A] in S2 
Remark: From this basic result we can conclude that double-negation translations 
(Gentzen/Gödel) can also interpret Classical logic into the logic of Constant Domains (CD) and into 
Dummett’s logic. We can also give a general explanation why we can use the same translation to 
interpret classical logic into intuitionistic logic and minimal logic. 
Theorem 2: The translation F of theorem 1 cannot be a translation from S3 into S1. 
Proof: Assume F is a translation from S3 into S2. Then, Γ⎥⎯S3 A ⇔ F(Γ)⏐⎯S2 F(A). Take 
any Γ and A such that Γ⎥⎯S1A. Given that F is a translation from S1 into S2, we have that 
F(Γ)⏐⎯S2F(A) and hence that  (because F is also a translation fro  S  i t   Γ⎥⎯S3 A. , every 
deductive relation in S1 is also a deductive relation in S3 and S3 would not be an intermediate 
logic, as we had assumed. 
3. References 
